Washington
Post (Nov. 6, 2005).
The
FBI's Secret Scrutiny.
In Hunt for Terrorists, Bureau Examines
Records of Ordinary Americans
The FBI came calling in Windsor, Conn.,
this summer with a document marked for delivery by hand. On Matianuk Avenue,
across from the tennis courts, two special agents found their man. They gave
George Christian the letter, which warned him to tell no one, ever, what it
said.
Under the shield and stars of the FBI
crest, the letter directed Christian to surrender "all subscriber
information, billing information and access logs of any person" who used a
specific computer at a library branch some distance away. Christian, who
manages digital records for three dozen Connecticut libraries, said in an
affidavit that he configures his system for privacy. But the vendors of the
software he operates said their databases can reveal the Web sites that
visitors browse, the e-mail accounts they open and the books they borrow.
Christian refused to hand over those records, and his employer, Library
Connection Inc., filed suit for the right to protest the FBI demand in public.
The Washington Post established their identities -- still under seal in the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit -- by comparing unsealed portions of
the file with public records and information gleaned from people who had no
knowledge of the FBI demand.
The Connecticut case affords a rare
glimpse of an exponentially growing practice of domestic surveillance under the
USA Patriot Act, which marked its fourth anniversary on Oct. 26. "National security letters," created in
the 1970s for espionage and terrorism investigations,
originated as narrow exceptions in consumer privacy law, enabling the
FBI to review in secret the customer records of suspected foreign agents. The Patriot
Act, and Bush administration guidelines for its use, transformed
those letters by permitting clandestine scrutiny of U.S. residents and
visitors who are not alleged to be terrorists or spies.
The FBI now issues more than 30,000
national security letters a year, according to government sources, a
hundredfold increase over historic norms. The letters -- one of which can be
used to sweep up the records of many people -- are extending the bureau's reach
as never before into the telephone calls, correspondence and financial lives of
ordinary Americans.
Issued by FBI field supervisors, national
security letters do not need the imprimatur of a prosecutor, grand jury or
judge. They receive no review after the fact by the Justice Department or
Congress. The executive branch maintains only statistics, which are incomplete
and confined to classified reports. The Bush administration defeated
legislation and a lawsuit to require a public accounting, and has offered no
example in which the use of a national security letter helped disrupt a
terrorist plot.
The burgeoning use of national security
letters coincides with an unannounced decision to deposit all the information
they yield into government data banks -- and to share those private records
widely, in the federal government and beyond. In late 2003, the Bush
administration reversed a long-standing policy requiring agents to destroy
their files on innocent American citizens, companies and residents when
investigations closed. Late last month, President Bush signed Executive Order 13388, expanding access to those files
for "state, local and tribal" governments and for "appropriate
private sector entities," which are not defined.
National security letters offer a case
study of the impact of the Patriot Act outside the spotlight of political
debate. Drafted in haste after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, the law's 132 pages
wrought scores of changes in the landscape of intelligence and law enforcement.
Many received far more attention than the amendments to a seemingly pedestrian
power to review "transactional records." But few if any other
provisions touch as many ordinary Americans without their knowledge.
Senior FBI officials acknowledged in
interviews that the proliferation of national security letters results
primarily from the bureau's new authority to collect intimate facts about
people who are not suspected of any wrongdoing. Criticized for failure to
detect the Sept. 11 plot, the bureau now casts a much wider net, using national
security letters to generate leads as well as to pursue them. Casual or
unwitting contact with a suspect -- a single telephone call, for example -- may
attract the attention of investigators and subject a person to scrutiny about
which he never learns.
A national security letter cannot be used
to authorize eavesdropping or to read the contents of e-mail. But it does
permit investigators to trace revealing paths through the private affairs of a
modern digital citizen. The records it yields describe where a person makes and
spends money, with whom he lives and lived before, how much he gambles, what he
buys online, what he pawns and borrows, where he travels, how he invests, what
he searches for and reads on the Web, and who telephones or e-mails him at home
and at work.
As it wrote the Patriot Act four years
ago, Congress bought time and leverage for oversight by placing an expiration
date on 16 provisions. The changes involving national security letters were not
among them. In fact, as the Dec. 31 deadline approaches and Congress prepares
to renew or make permanent the expiring provisions, House and Senate conferees
are poised again to amplify the FBI's power to compel the secret surrender of
private records.
The House and Senate have voted to make
noncompliance with a national security letter a criminal offense. The House
would also impose a prison term for breach of secrecy.
Like many Patriot Act provisions, the ones involving national security letters
have been debated in largely abstract terms. The Justice Department has offered
Congress no concrete information, even in classified form, save for a partial
count of the number of letters delivered. The statistics do not cover all forms
of national security letters or all U.S. agencies making use of them.
"The beef with the NSLs is that they
don't have even a pretense of judicial or impartial scrutiny," said former
representative Robert L. Barr Jr. (Ga.), who finds himself allied with the
American Civil Liberties Union after a career as prosecutor, CIA analyst and
conservative GOP stalwart. "There's no checks and balances whatever on
them. It is simply some bureaucrat's decision that they want information, and
they can basically just go and get it."
'A Routine Tool'.
Career investigators and Bush administration officials
emphasized, in congressional testimony and interviews for this story, that
national security letters are for hunting terrorists, not fishing through the
private lives of the innocent. The distinction is not as clear in practice.
Under the old legal test, the FBI had to
have "specific and articulable" reasons to believe the records it
gathered in secret belonged to a terrorist or a spy. Now the bureau needs only
to certify that the records are "sought for" or "relevant
to" an investigation "to protect against international terrorism or
clandestine intelligence activities."
That standard enables investigators to
look for conspirators by sifting the records of nearly anyone who crosses a
suspect's path.
"If you have a list of, say, 20
telephone numbers that have come up . . . on a bad guy's telephone," said
Valerie E. Caproni, the FBI's general counsel, "you want to find out who
he's in contact with." Investigators will say, " 'Okay, phone
company, give us subscriber information and toll records on these 20 telephone
numbers,' and that can easily be 100."
Bush administration officials compare
national security letters to grand jury subpoenas, which are also based on
"relevance" to an inquiry. There are differences. Grand juries tend
to have a narrower focus because they investigate past conduct, not the
speculative threat of unknown future attacks. Recipients of grand jury
subpoenas are generally free to discuss the subpoenas publicly. And there are
strict limits on sharing grand jury information with government agencies.
Since the Patriot Act, the FBI has
dispersed the authority to sign national security letters to more than five
dozen supervisors -- the special agents in charge of field offices, the
deputies in New York, Los Angeles and Washington, and a few senior headquarters
officials. FBI rules established after the Patriot Act allow the letters to be
issued long before a case is judged substantial enough for a "full field
investigation." Agents commonly use the letters now in "preliminary
investigations" and in the "threat assessments" that precede a
decision whether to launch an investigation.
"Congress has given us this tool to
obtain basic telephone data, basic banking data, basic credit reports,"
said Caproni, who is among the officials with signature authority. "The
fact that a national security letter is a routine tool used, that doesn't
bother me."
If agents had to wait for grounds to
suspect a person of ill intent, said Joseph Billy Jr., the FBI's deputy
assistant director for counterterrorism, they would already know what they want
to find out with a national security letter. "It's all chicken and
egg," he said. "We're trying to determine if someone warrants
scrutiny or doesn't."
Billy said he understands that
"merely being in a government or FBI database . . . gives everybody, you
know, neck hair standing up." Innocent Americans, he said, "should
take comfort at least knowing that it is done under a great deal of
investigative care, oversight, within the parameters of the law."
He added: "That's not going to
satisfy a majority of people, but . . . I've had people say, you know, 'Hey, I
don't care, I've done nothing to be concerned about. You can have me in your
files and that's that.' Some people take that approach."
In Room 7975 of the J. Edgar Hoover Building, around two corners from the
director's suite, the chief of the FBI's national security law unit sat down at
his keyboard about a month after the Patriot Act became law. Michael J. Woods had
helped devise the FBI wish list for surveillance powers. Now he offered a
caution.
"NSLs are powerful investigative
tools, in that they can compel the production of substantial amounts of
relevant information," he wrote in a Nov. 28, 2001, "electronic communication"
to the FBI's 56 field offices. "However, they must be used
judiciously." Standing guidelines, he wrote, "require that the FBI
accomplish its investigations through the 'least intrusive' means. . . . The
greater availability of NSLs does not mean that they should be used in every
case."
Woods, who left government service in 2002, added a practical consideration.
Legislators granted the new authority and could as easily take it back. When
making that decision, he wrote, "Congress certainly will examine the
manner in which the FBI exercised it."
Looking back last month, Woods was struck
by how starkly he misjudged the climate. The FBI disregarded his warning, and
no one noticed.
"This is not something that should
be automatically done because it's easy," he said. "We need to be
sure . . . we don't go overboard."
One thing Woods did not anticipate was
then-Attorney General John D. Ashcroft's revision of Justice Department
guidelines. On May 30, 2002, and Oct. 31, 2003, Ashcroft rewrote the playbooks
for investigations of terrorist crimes and national security threats. He gave
overriding priority to preventing attacks by any means available.
Ashcroft remained bound by Executive
Order 12333, which requires the use of the "least intrusive means" in
domestic intelligence investigations. But his new interpretation came close to
upending the mandate. Three times in the new guidelines, Ashcroft wrote that
the FBI "should consider . . . less intrusive means" but "should
not hesitate to use any lawful techniques . . . even if intrusive" when
investigators believe them to be more timely. "This point," he added,
"is to be particularly observed in investigations relating to terrorist
activities."
'Why
Do You Want to Know?'
As the Justice Department prepared congressional testimony
this year, FBI headquarters searched for examples that would show how expanded
surveillance powers made a difference. Michael Mason, who runs the Washington
field office and has the rank of assistant FBI director, found no ready answer.
"I'd love to have a
made-for-Hollywood story, but I don't have one," Mason said. "I am
not even sure such an example exists."
What national security letters give his
agents, Mason said, is speed.
"I have 675 terrorism cases,"
he said. "Every one of these is a potential threat. And anything I can do
to get to the bottom of any one of them more quickly gets me closer to
neutralizing a potential threat."
Because recipients are permanently barred
from disclosing the letters, outsiders can make no assessment of their
relevance to Mason's task.
Woods, the former FBI lawyer, said secrecy is essential when an investigation
begins because "it would defeat the whole purpose" to tip off a
suspected terrorist or spy, but national security seldom requires that the
secret be kept forever. Even mobster "John Gotti finds out eventually that
he was wiretapped" in a criminal probe, said Peter Swire, the federal
government's chief privacy counselor until 2001. "Anyone caught up in an
NSL investigation never gets notice."
To establish the "relevance" of
the information they seek, agents face a test so basic it is hard to come up
with a plausible way to fail. A model request for a supervisor's signature,
according to internal FBI guidelines, offers this one-sentence suggestion:
"This subscriber information is being requested to determine the
individuals or entities that the subject has been in contact with during the
past six months."
Edward L. Williams, the chief division counsel in Mason's office, said that
supervisors, in practice, "aren't afraid to ask . . . 'Why do you want to
know?' " He would not say how many requests, if any, are rejected.
'The
Abuse Is in the Power Itself'
Those who favor the new rules maintain -- as Sen. Pat
Roberts (R-Kan.), chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, put
it in a prepared statement -- that "there has not been one substantiated
allegation of abuse of these lawful intelligence tools."
What the Bush administration means by
abuse is unauthorized use of surveillance data -- for example, to blackmail an
enemy or track an estranged spouse. Critics are focused elsewhere. What
troubles them is not unofficial abuse but the official and routine intrusion
into private lives.
To Jeffrey Breinholt, deputy chief of the
Justice Department's counterterrorism section, the civil liberties objections
"are eccentric." Data collection on the innocent, he said, does no
harm unless "someone [decides] to act on the information, put you on a
no-fly list or something." Only a serious error, he said, could lead the
government, based on nothing more than someone's bank or phone records,
"to freeze your assets or go after you criminally and you suffer
consequences that are irreparable." He added: "It's a pretty small
chance."
"I don't necessarily want somebody
knowing what videos I rent or the fact that I like cartoons," said Mason,
the Washington field office chief. But if those records "are never used
against a person, if they're never used to put him in jail, or deprive him of a
vote, et cetera, then what is the argument?"
Barr, the former congressman, said that
"the abuse is in the power itself."
"As a conservative," he said,
"I really resent an administration that calls itself conservative taking
the position that the burden is on the citizen to show the government has
abused power, and otherwise shut up and comply."
At the ACLU, staff attorney Jameel Jaffer
spoke of "the profound chilling effect" of this kind of surveillance:
"If the government monitors the Web sites that people visit and the books
that they read, people will stop visiting disfavored Web sites and stop reading
disfavored books. The FBI should not have unchecked authority to keep track of
who visits [al-Jazeera's Web site] or who visits the Web site of the Federalist
Society."
Links in a Chain
Ready access to national security letters
allows investigators to employ them routinely for "contact chaining."
"Starting with your bad guy and his
telephone number and looking at who he's calling, and [then] who they're
calling," the number of people surveilled "goes up exponentially,"
acknowledged Caproni, the FBI's general counsel.
But Caproni said it would not be rational for the bureau to follow the chain
too far. "Everybody's connected" if investigators keep tracing calls
"far enough away from your targeted bad guy," she said. "What's
the point of that?"
One point is to fill government data
banks for another investigative technique. That one is called "link
analysis," a practice Caproni would neither confirm nor deny.
Two years ago, Ashcroft rescinded a 1995 guideline directing that information
obtained through a national security letter about a U.S. citizen or resident
"shall be destroyed by the FBI and not further disseminated" if it
proves "not relevant to the purposes for which it was collected."
Ashcroft's new order was that "the FBI shall retain" all records it
collects and "may disseminate" them freely among federal agencies.
The same order directed the FBI to
develop "data mining" technology to probe for hidden links among the
people in its growing cache of electronic files. According to an FBI status
report, the bureau's office of intelligence began operating in January 2004 a
new Investigative Data Warehouse, based on the same Oracle technology used by
the CIA. The CIA is generally forbidden to keep such files on Americans.
Data mining intensifies the impact of
national security letters, because anyone's personal files can be scrutinized
again and again without a fresh need to establish relevance.
"The composite picture of a person
which emerges from transactional information is more telling than the direct
content of your speech," said Woods, the former FBI lawyer. "That's
certainly not been lost on the intelligence community and the FBI."
Ashcroft's new guidelines allowed the FBI
for the first time to add to government files consumer data from commercial
providers such as LexisNexis and ChoicePoint Inc. Previous attorneys general
had decided that such a move would violate the Privacy Act. In many field
offices, agents said, they now have access to ChoicePoint in their squad rooms.
What national security letters add to
government data banks is information that no commercial service can lawfully
possess. Strict privacy laws, for example, govern financial and communications
records. National security letters -- along with the more powerful but much
less frequently used secret subpoenas from the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court -- override them.
'What Happens in Vegas'
The bureau displayed its ambition for
data mining in an emergency operation at the end of 2003.
The Department of Homeland Security
declared an orange alert on Dec. 21 of that year, in part because of
intelligence that hinted at a New Year's Eve attack in Las Vegas. The
identities of the plotters were unknown.
The FBI sent Gurvais Grigg, chief of the
bureau's little-known Proactive Data Exploitation Unit, in an audacious effort
to assemble a real-time census of every visitor in the nation's most-visited
city. An average of about 300,000 tourists a day stayed an average of four days
each, presenting Grigg's team with close to a million potential suspects in the
ensuing two weeks.
A former stockbroker with a degree in
biochemistry, Grigg declined to be interviewed. Government and private sector
sources who followed the operation described epic efforts to vacuum up
information.
An interagency task force began pulling
together the records of every hotel guest, everyone who rented a car or truck,
every lease on a storage space, and every airplane passenger who landed in the
city. Grigg's unit filtered that population for leads. Any link to the known
terrorist universe -- a shared address or utility account, a check deposited, a
telephone call -- could give investigators a start.
"It was basically a manhunt, and in
circumstances where there is a manhunt, the most effective way of doing that
was to scoop up a lot of third party data and compare it to other data we were
getting," Breinholt said.
Investigators began with emergency
requests for help from the city's sprawling hospitality industry. "A lot
of it was done voluntary at first," said Billy, the deputy assistant FBI
director.
According to others directly involved,
investigators turned to national security letters and grand jury subpoenas when
friendly persuasion did not work.
Early in the operation, according to
participants, the FBI gathered casino executives and asked for guest lists. The
MGM Mirage company, followed by others, balked.
"Some casinos were saying no to
consent [and said], 'You have to produce a piece of paper,' " said Jeff
Jonas, chief scientist at IBM Entity Analytics, who previously built data
management systems for casino surveillance. "They don't just market 'What
happens in Vegas stays in Vegas.' They want it to be true."
The operation remained secret for about a
week. Then casino sources told Rod Smith, gaming editor of the Las Vegas
Review-Journal, that the FBI had served national security letters on them. In
an interview for this article, one former casino executive confirmed the use of
a national security letter. Details remain elusive. Some law enforcement
officials, speaking on the condition of anonymity because they had not been
authorized to divulge particulars, said they relied primarily on grand jury
subpoenas. One said in an interview that national security letters may
eventually have been withdrawn. Agents encouraged voluntary disclosures, he
said, by raising the prospect that the FBI would use the letters to gather
something more sensitive: the gambling profiles of casino guests. Caproni
declined to confirm or deny that account.
What happened in Vegas stayed in federal
data banks. Under Ashcroft's revised policy, none of the information has been
purged. For every visitor, Breinholt said, "the record of the Las Vegas
hotel room would still exist."
Grigg's operation found no suspect, and
the orange alert ended on Jan. 10, 2004."The whole thing washed out,"
one participant said.
'Of Interest to President Bush'
At around the time the FBI found George
Christian in Connecticut, agents from the bureau's Charlotte field office paid
an urgent call on the chemical engineering department at North Carolina State
University in Raleigh. They were looking for information about a former student
named Magdy Nashar, then suspected in the July 7 London subway bombing but
since cleared of suspicion.
University officials said in interviews
late last month that the FBI tried to use a national security letter to demand
much more information than the law allows.
David T. Drooz, the university's senior
associate counsel, said special authority is required for the surrender of
records protected by educational and medical privacy. The FBI's first request,
a July 14 grand jury subpoena, did not appear to supply that authority, Drooz
said, and the university did not honor it. Referring to notes he took that day,
Drooz said Eric Davis, the FBI's top lawyer in Charlotte, "was focused
very much on the urgency" and "he even indicated the case was of interest
to President Bush."
The next day, July 15, FBI agents arrived
with a national security letter. Drooz said it demanded all records of Nashar's
admission, housing, emergency contacts, use of health services and
extracurricular activities. University lawyers "looked up what law we
could on the fly," he said. They discovered that the FBI was demanding
files that national security letters have no power to obtain. The statute the
FBI cited that day covers only telephone and Internet records.
"We're very eager to comply with the
authorities in this regard, but we needed to have what we felt was a legally
valid procedure," said Larry A. Neilsen, the university provost.
Soon afterward, the FBI returned with a
new subpoena. It was the same as the first one, Drooz said, and the university
still had doubts about its legal sufficiency. This time, however, it came from
New York and summoned Drooz to appear personally. The tactic was "a bit
heavy-handed," Drooz said, "the implication being you're subject to
contempt of court." Drooz surrendered the records.
The FBI's Charlotte office referred
questions to headquarters. A high-ranking FBI official, who spoke on the
condition of anonymity, acknowledged that the field office erred in attempting
to use a national security letter. Investigators, he said, "were in a big
hurry for obvious reasons" and did not approach the university "in
the exact right way."
'Unreasonable' or 'Oppressive'
The electronic docket in the Connecticut
case, as the New York Times first reported, briefly titled the lawsuit Library
Connection Inc. v. Gonzales . Because identifying details were not supposed
to be left in the public file, the court soon replaced the plaintiff's name
with "John Doe."
George Christian, Library Connection's
executive director, is identified in his affidavit as "John Doe 2."
In that sworn statement, he said people often come to libraries for information
that is "highly sensitive, embarrassing or personal." He wanted to
fight the FBI but feared calling a lawyer because the letter said he could not
disclose its existence to "any person." He consulted Peter Chase,
vice president of Library Connection and chairman of a state intellectual
freedom committee. Chase -- "John Doe 1" in his affidavit -- advised
Christian to call the ACLU. Reached by telephone at their homes, both men
declined to be interviewed.
U.S. District Judge Janet C. Hall ruled
in September that the FBI gag order violates Christian's, and Library
Connection's, First Amendment rights. A three-judge panel heard oral argument
on Wednesday in the government's appeal.
The central facts remain opaque, even to
the judges, because the FBI is not obliged to describe what it is looking for,
or why. During oral argument in open court on Aug. 31, Hall said one government
explanation was so vague that "if I were to say it out loud, I would get
quite a laugh here." After the government elaborated in a classified brief
delivered for her eyes only, she wrote in her decision that it offered
"nothing specific."
The Justice Department tried to conceal
the existence of the first and only other known lawsuit against a national
security letter, also brought by the ACLU's Jaffer and Ann Beeson. Government
lawyers opposed its entry into the public docket of a New York federal judge.
They have since tried to censor nearly all the contents of the exhibits and
briefs. They asked the judge, for example, to black out every line of the
affidavit that describes the delivery of the national security letter to a New
York Internet company, including, "I am a Special Agent of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation ('FBI')."
U.S. District Judge Victor Marrero, in a
ruling that is under appeal, held that the law authorizing national security
letters violates the First and Fourth Amendments.
Resistance to national security letters
is rare. Most of them are served on large companies in highly regulated
industries, with business interests that favor cooperation. The in-house
lawyers who handle such cases, said Jim Dempsey, executive director of the
Center for Democracy and Technology, "are often former prosecutors --
instinctively pro-government but also instinctively by-the-books."
National security letters give them a shield against liability to their
customers.
Kenneth M. Breen, a partner at the New
York law firm Fulbright & Jaworski, held a seminar for corporate lawyers
one recent evening to explain the "significant risks for the
non-compliant" in government counterterrorism investigations. A former
federal prosecutor, Breen said failure to provide the required information
could create "the perception that your company didn't live up to its duty
to fight terrorism" and could invite class-action lawsuits from the
families of terrorism victims. In extreme cases, he said, a business could face
criminal prosecution, "a 'death sentence' for certain kinds of companies."
The volume of government information
demands, even so, has provoked a backlash. Several major business groups,
including the National Association of Manufacturers and the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, complained in an Oct. 4 letter to senators that customer records can
"too easily be obtained and disseminated" around the government.
National security letters, they wrote, have begun to impose an "expensive
and time-consuming burden" on business.
The House and Senate bills renewing the
Patriot Act do not tighten privacy protections, but they offer a concession to
business interests. In both bills, a judge may modify a national security
letter if it imposes an "unreasonable" or "oppressive" burden
on the company that is asked for information.
'A Legitimate Question'
As national security letters have grown
in number and importance, oversight has not kept up. In each house of Congress,
jurisdiction is divided between the judiciary and intelligence committees. None
of the four Republican chairmen agreed to be interviewed.
Roberts, the Senate intelligence
chairman, said in a statement issued through his staff that "the committee
is well aware of the intelligence value of the information that is lawfully
collected under these national security letter authorities," which he
described as "non-intrusive" and "crucial to tracking terrorist
networks and detecting clandestine intelligence activities." Senators
receive "valuable reporting by the FBI," he said, in
"semi-annual reports [that] provide the committee with the information
necessary to conduct effective oversight."
Roberts was referring to the Justice
Department's classified statistics, which in fact have been delivered three
times in four years. They include the following information: how many times the
FBI issued national security letters; whether the letters sought financial,
credit or communications records; and how many of the targets were "U.S.
persons." The statistics omit one whole category of FBI national security
letters and also do not count letters issued by the Defense Department and
other agencies.
Committee members have occasionally asked
to see a sampling of national security letters, a description of their fruits
or examples of their contribution to a particular case. The Justice Department
has not obliged.
In 2004, the conference report attached
to the intelligence authorization bill asked the attorney general to
"include in his next semiannual report" a description of "the
scope of such letters" and the "process and standards for
approving" them. More than a year has passed without a Justice Department
reply.
"The committee chairman has the
power to issue subpoenas" for information from the executive branch, said
Rep. Zoe Lofgren (D-Calif.), a House Judiciary Committee member. "The
minority has no power to compel, and . . . Republicans are not going to push
for oversight of the Republicans. That's the story of this Congress."
In the executive branch, no FBI or
Justice Department official audits the use of national security letters to
assess whether they are appropriately targeted, lawfully applied or contribute
important facts to an investigation.
Justice Department officials noted
frequently this year that Inspector General Glenn A. Fine reports twice a year
on abuses of the Patriot Act and has yet to substantiate any complaint. (One
investigation is pending.) Fine advertises his role, but there is a puzzle
built into the mandate. Under what scenario could a person protest a search of
his personal records if he is never notified?
"We do rely upon complaints coming
in," Fine said in House testimony in May. He added: "To the extent
that people do not know of anything happening to them, there is an issue about
whether they can complain. So, I think that's a legitimate question."
Asked more recently whether Fine's office
has conducted an independent examination of national security letters, Deputy
Inspector General Paul K. Martin said in an interview: "We have not
initiated a broad-based review that examines the use of specific provisions of
the Patriot Act."
At the FBI, senior officials said the
most important check on their power is that Congress is watching.
"People have to depend on their
elected representatives to do the job of oversight they were elected to
do," Caproni said. "And we think they do a fine job of it."
Researcher Julie Tate and research editor
Lucy Shackelford contributed to this report.