Wall Street Journal (1.28.08).
Listening to the Enemy
By ROGER PILON
Today the Senate takes up a bipartisan surveillance authorization
measure that's already passed the Intelligence Committee. The clock is ticking.
This Friday a temporary law called the Protect America Act will expire. If
Congress does not act before then, the president's statutory power to prevent
terrorist attacks will be seriously compromised.
This dangerous situation should never have arisen. From the
beginning, presidents have exercised their Article II executive power to gather
foreign intelligence -- in war and peace alike, without congressional or judicial
intrusion. As our principal agent in foreign affairs, the president is
constitutionally bound to protect the nation. For that, intelligence is
essential.
Intelligence is essential on the domestic side as well,
where law enforcement is the president's main function. Yet not until 1967 did
the Supreme Court require warrants for electronic surveillance. Congress
codified that a year later. But both the court and Congress expressly exempted
foreign-intelligence gathering from the warrant requirement.
Unfortunately, the exception was not to last. Following the
Vietnam War, Congress increasingly inserted itself into foreign affairs, as
with the 1973 War Powers Act. With the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act,
passed in 1978, Congress began micromanaging foreign intelligence gathering.
That produced the "wall" between foreign and domestic intelligence
gathering -- with foreign-intelligence agents focused on security, and domestic
agents on prosecution and hence on obtaining "admissible" evidence.
Neither side talked to the other. Many believe the resulting communications
failures played a role in 9/11.
In the aftermath of 9/11, believing FISA to be hopelessly
inadequate, President Bush instituted his terrorist surveillance program (TSP)
-- but not before advising key members of Congress. Nevertheless, a firestorm
ensued when the New York Times made the program public in December 2005. The
controversy continued until January 2007, when the White House announced that
henceforth it would gather intelligence under FISA's antiquated restrictions.
Cooler heads in Congress grew concerned after Director of
National Intelligence Michael McConnell testified in July that "we're
actually missing a significant portion of [the intelligence] we should be
getting." That led to last August's six-month fix, which expires this
week.
Obviously, this is no way to conduct the serious business of
foreign intelligence. The ever-changing rules -- criminalizing transgressions
-- leave officials playing it safe in a world of risks.
The Senate bill would be an improvement, not least because
it provides retroactive liability protection for telecom companies that
allegedly assisted the government after 9/11. But the deeper problem is the
very idea of congressional micromanagement.
The Senate bill would require showing probable cause before
targeting even U.S. persons abroad, dramatically increasing the role of
the FISA court. As Judge Richard Posner wrote on this page two years ago, FISA
may be valuable for monitoring communications of known terrorists,
"but it is hopeless as a framework for detecting terrorists. It requires
that surveillance be conducted pursuant to warrants based on probable cause to
believe that the target of surveillance is a terrorist, when the desperate need
is to find out who is a terrorist."
The technical impediments to legislating are even greater.
We're long past alligator clips on copper wires. Today, electronic
communication is broken into discrete packets that travel along independent
routes before being reassembled. As K.A. Taipale, executive director of the
Center for Advanced Studies in Science and Technology Policy, has written,
"even targeting a specific message from a known sender requires
intercepting (i.e., scanning and filtering) the entire communication flow."
Yet the Senate bill requires that intelligence analysts count the people in the
U.S. whose communications were "reviewed," an all but impossible
distraction for analysts already stretched.
Privacy concerns are not trivial. The Constitution protects
against "unreasonable" searches. But even with law enforcement, where
the main function is ex post prosecution, not ex ante protection, there are
numerous exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. Yet Congress
insists still on micromanaging the president -- and he, by failing to assert
his authority early on, is now reduced to bargaining with Congress over minutia
that will soon be as obsolete and dangerous as the underlying act is today.
John Locke, no sometime civil libertarian, put it well when
he observed that the foreign affairs power "is much less capable to be
directed by antecedent, standing, positive Laws, than [by] the Executive."
The Federalist's authors, James Madison, Alexander Hamilton and John Jay, all
agreed. The remedy for executive incompetence or recklessness in foreign
affairs is political -- not legislative, much less legal. Congress, to say
nothing of the courts, can no more manage such affairs than it can the economy.
What better evidence than these surveillance fits and starts?
Mr. Pilon holds the Cato Institute's B. Kenneth Simon Chair
in Constitutional Studies